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Abstract
We study the interaction among users of unstructured file sharing applications, who compete for available network
resources (link bandwidth or capacity) by opening multiple connections on multiple paths so as to accelerate data
transfer. We model this interaction with an unstructured file sharing game. Users are players and their strategies
are the numbers of sessions on available paths. We consider a general bandwidth sharing framework proposed by
Kelly [1] and Mo and Walrand [2], with TCP as a special case. Furthermore, we incorporate the Tit-for-Tat strategy
(adopted by BitTorrent [3] networks) into the unstructured file sharing game to model the competition in which
a connection can be set up only when both users find this connection beneficial. We refer to this as an overlay
formation game. We prove the existence of Nash equilibrium in several variants of both games, and quantify the
losses of efficiency of Nash equilibria. We find that the loss of efficiency due to selfish behavior is still unbounded
even when the Tit-for-Tat strategy is believed to prevent selfish behavior.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently peer-to-peer applications (e.g., BitTorrent [3], Kazaa, eDonkey, and Gnutella [4]) have become very
popular. They can be major contributors of the Internet traffic. For example, Sprint’s IP Monitoring Project [5]
shows that in April 2003, 20 − 40% of total bytes corresponded to peer-to-peer traffic on one backbone link.
CacheLogic [6] estimates that peer-to-peer generated 60% of all US Internet traffic at the end of 2004.
We refer to the networks for these peer-to-peer applications as unstructured file sharing overlay networks.
These networks are overlay networks since users forward or relay traffic for each other. These networks are also
unstructured because there are no well-defined network topologies, and users are not under the control of some
central entity. For comparison, Resilient Overlay Network [7] is a structured overlay network. Given the increasingly
large share of Internet traffic from unstructured file sharing networks, it is important to understand the behavior
and performance of such networks, and such a fundamental understanding will certainly help ISPs and aid in the
design of future Internet architecture.
In this paper, we investigate the strategic behavior of self-interested peers/users of such unstructured file sharing
overlay networks. Our work differs from previous works on peer-to-peer applications, whose focus are on file
searching and replication [8], and topology discovery [9]. Specifically, our investigations are from two different
angles.
First, we study the interaction among users of unstructured file sharing applications, who compete for available
network resources (link bandwidth or capacity) by opening multiple connections or sessions on multiple paths
so as to accelerate data transfer. We introduce an unstructured file sharing game to model this interaction. In
this game, users are players and their strategies are the numbers of sessions on available paths. The data rate
allocated to connections are determined by the network. The mechanism of rate allocation considered by us is
a general bandwidth sharing framework proposed by Kelly [1] with TCP networks as special cases [10][2]. Our
focus is on TCP networks in which all connections/sessions are TCP connections. The unstructured file sharing
game generalizes the TCP connection game introduced in [11] where the competition for a single bottleneck link
capacity is investigated.
Second, we incorporate the Tit-for-Tat strategy into the unstructured file sharing game. This strategy is widely
known and built into BitTorrent [3] networks. With this strategy, peers set up a connection between themselves
only when they both find it beneficial. We model this interaction scenario as an overlay formation game. In order
to make our model tractable, we restrict users to open either zero or one connection to another peer.
In both games, users are interested in maximizing their benefits, a combination of some utility function and the
cost associated with maintaining data transfer sessions. We assume that utility functions are increasing and concave
functions of the data throughput in bits per second. Throughput is defined as the successful packet delivery rate.
The cost incurred to users includes memory cost and CPU cost. As in [11], we consider a cost that is proportional
to the total number of connections opened by a user. We also consider another type of cost which is proportional
to a user’s packet sending rate.
We are interested in the following questions. First, does there exist a stable network state (i.e., Nash equilibrium
(NE) [12]) in both games? If so, what is the system performance at a NE? Specifically, we are interested in the loss
of efficiency of a NE and the price of anarchy [13] of NE(s). The loss of efficiency of a NE is defined as the ratio of
the optimal system performance over the system performance at the NE, and the worst loss of efficiency is referred
to as the price of anarchy [13]. These metrics capture how bad the competition can be among self-interested TCP
users. Here we focus on pure strategy NE.
We make the following contributions.
First, we give a formal formulation of unstructured file sharing game, and show by examples that multiple NEs
exist on general network topologies. We then focus on parallel link networks and star networks, which are used
to model peer-to-peer applications (similar topologies were also studied in [14][15]). We prove the existence of
NE of unstructured file sharing games on both networks, and find that, if users are not resource constrained, the
efficiency loss of NEs can be unbounded (i.e., price of anarchy is arbitrarily large). Fortunately, if there are resource
constraints for users, the efficiency loss is upper bounded. We also demonstrate the stability of NE in best-response
dynamics in several variants of the game.
Second, we model the Tit-for-Tat strategy in unstructured file sharing networks by an overlay formation game.
We show analytically the existence of equilibrium overlay networks and that the loss of efficiency can be arbitrarily
large. Tit-for-Tat is believed to prevent selfish behavior. However, our results show that the loss of efficiency due
to selfish behavior can still be unbounded.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related work is presented in Section II. The problem formulation
for unstructured file sharing game is given in Section III. In Sections IV and V, we focus on unstructured file
sharing game on a parallel link network and star network. We address the overlay formation game in Section VI.
Conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Johari et al [16] study a congestion game where users of a congested resource anticipate the effect of their
actions on the price of the resource. In [16] users compete for each link independently from other links in the
network. But this independence characteristic is not true for our model, because if a user opens a connection on a
path, then all links of this path must carry this connection. [17] and [11] study the interactions among selfish TCP
users competing for a single bottleneck link. The unstructured file sharing game in this paper can be thought of as
a generalized version of the game in [11].
[18][19] propose multi-path congestion controllers by which users can coordinate the data transfer sessions on
several different paths to improve data throughput. A multi-path congestion controller chooses rates at which
to send data on all of the paths available to it. In our models, all sessions controlled by a single user are
independent congestion controllers. [14] studies how Tit-for-Tat affects selfish peers who are able to set their
uploading bandwidth. Our work differs from [14] in that we assume that a user can benefit by changing the number
of connections to open. The analytical framework for our overlay formation game is in [20].
III. UNSTRUCTURED FILE SHARING GAME
A. Formulations
Consider a network consisting of J links, numbered 1, ..., J . Link j has a capacity given by Cj > 0; we let
C = (C1, C2, ..., CJ) denote the vector of capacities. A set of users {1, ..., R} share this network. We assume that
there exists a set of paths through the network, numbered 1, ..., P . By an abuse of notation, we will use J,N, P to
also denote the sets of links, users, and paths, respectively. Each path p ∈ P uses a subset of the set of links J ; if
link j is used by path p, we will denote this by writing j ∈ p. Each user r ∈ R has a collection of paths available
through the network; if path p serves user r, we will denote this by writing p ∈ r.
Each user can open a number of concurrent connections nrp on each path p with p ∈ r. This defines a strategy
vector for user r as nr = (nrp) with p ∈ P and p ∈ r. Then a composite strategy vector of all users is given by
n = (n1, ...,nR). For a given n, a certain rate allocation mechanism allocates a traffic rate yp to each connection
on path p. We will discuss rate allocation mechanisms in the following section. For now, we simply state that,
∀p ∈ P , yp is a function of n. We use vector y = (yp, p ∈ P ) to represent a rate allocation on all paths.
The total date rate or throughput Gr obtained by a user r is: Gr(nr) =
∑
p∈r nrpyp, where nrp is the number of
connections opened by user r on path p. As yp (∀p ∈ P ) is a function of n, the throughput of user r is a function
of the number of connections of all users, namely, Gr = f(n). Any feasible rate allocation y must satisfy the
capacity constraint:
∑
r∈R
∑
p:j∈p nrpyp ≤ Cj , j ∈ J.
We assume that user r receives a utility Ur(Gr) when obtaining throughput Gr. We assume that Ur is a continuous,
concave, and non-decreasing function of Gr, with domain Gr ≥ 0. A user r has some cost Φr(nr) associated with
opened connections. We assume that this cost is proportional to the total number of connections opened by this
user on all its available paths: Φr(nr) = β
∑
p∈r nrp. Note that β ∈ [0, 1], and it is interpreted as the aggressiveness
coefficient. Smaller β corresponds to more powerful computation resources. This type of cost is also considered in
[11]. In general, we can assume that Φr is a continuous, convex, and non-decreasing function of nr. The payoff
or benefit of a user r is a linear combination of utility Ur and cost Φr, defined as:
Br(nr) = Ur(nr)− Φr(nr). (1)
B. Rate Allocation Mechanism
We assume that the network allocates data rates to connections based on the α-bandwidth allocation scheme
[10][1][2]:
maximizey
∑
pwpn
α
p
(ypnp)(1−α)
1−α (2)
subject to ∑r∈R∑p:j∈p nrpyp ≤ Cj , j ∈ J (3)
np =
∑
r:p∈r nrp∀p ∈ P. (4)
where wp is the weight of path p. np is the number of connections or sessions on path p. Different values of α give
different rate allocations. For example, as α → ∞, this allocation mechanism corresponds to Max-Min fairness.
Rate allocation in a TCP network is well approximated with α = 2 and wp = 1/(RTTp)2. Here, RTTp is the
Round Trip Time (RTT) of path p.
In a single link case and where all paths have the same RTT, this α-bandwidth allocation is simplified to a simple
rate allocation mechanism. That is, for a link shared by n flows with the same RTT, each flow or connection gets
an equal share of the bandwidth of the link, namely,
y = C/n. (5)
Thus if a user r has nr flows, then its throughput Gr is:
Gr(nr) =
 Cnr/
∑
w∈R nw, if nr > 0
0, otherwise
(6)
Remarks. Note that this simple rate allocation mechanism cannot be extended to a network setting. Specifically,
after we calculate the rate allocated to each user on each link according to (5), we cannot simply say that the
allocated rate on a path can be given by yrp = minj∈pyrj , ∀r ∈ R. An illustrative example is given in Appendix I.
Note that the authors of [16] can use this rate allocation mechanism because in their case, users compete for
each link independently from other links. However, in our case, links can not be treated independently, as all links
of a path must carry the connections opened on this path. As shown in the following section, this requirement
makes the throughput of a user neither a concave nor convex in the numbers of connections opened by this user.
Thus, it is difficult to apply the existing game-theoretic results (which requires concavity of utility functions) to the
unstructured file sharing game on general network topology. Thus, in this paper we focus on two specific networks:
parallel links and a star.
C. Unstructured File Sharing Game
Based on the previous formulations, we now introduce an unstructured file sharing game. In this game, each
user r tries to maximize its aggregate benefit Br by adjusting nr, its number of connections on its available paths.
Namely, a user r tries to solve the following optimization problem:
maxnr Br(nr,y∗(nr)) (7)
s.t. nrp ∈ [0, nmaxrp ], ∀rp ∈ Pr (8)
y∗ = argmaxy
∑
p
wpn
α
p
(ypnp)(1−α)
1− α (9)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
∑
p:j∈p
nrpyp ≤ Cj , j ∈ J
np =
∑
r:p∈r
nrp ,∀p ∈ P
The decision variables of user r is given by vector nr. The set of available paths of user r is represented by Pr.
(9) indicates that the throughput of each connection on a path is the solution of the optimization problem defined
in (2). If α = 2 and wp = 1/(RTTp)2 and the network is a single bottleneck link, this game becomes the TCP
connection game [11].
For a general network, we cannot obtain an explicit form of function Br(nr) because there is no closed form
solution for the rate allocation problem (9). However, as shown later, we can obtain an explicit form of Br(nr) for
some specific networks such as grid network, parallel link, and star network.
In fact, (7) is a Bi-level Programming problem which in general is NP-hard [21]. In this paper, we do not try to
obtain a general solution for (7) for each user. Instead, we focus on some special network topologies for which there
exist analytically tractable and closed form solutions to (9), and for these networks, we investigate the existence of
Nash equilibrium.
Let n∗r represent the solution to user r’s optimization problem defined above. Formally, we have:
n∗r = argmaxnrBr(n).
A Nash equilibrium (NE) is defined as a composite strategy profile or a vector of connections of all users, and no
user can gain by unilaterally deviating from it. We denote a Nash equilibrium by: n∗ = (n1∗,n2∗, ...,nR∗).
The NE of this game represents the stable network state of the interaction among all users. The network
performance at a NE is described by the loss of efficiency, defined as:
Leff = Bmax/Bne (10)
where Bne is the total benefit of all users when the network is at a NE, and Bmax is the maximum benefit. The
worst efficiency loss is also known as the price of anarchy [13].
Remarks. It is not necessarily true that the throughput Gr(nr) is an increasing function of nr. For example, in the
network shown in Figure 1, user r has three paths: p1, p2 and p3. p1 contains two links j1 and j2 with capacity C.
p2 contains link j1 and p2 contains link j2. According to the simple rate allocation mechanism introduced before,
if nr = (0, 1, 1), then Gr(nr) = 2C. However, if user r increases its number of connections on path p1 from zero
to one, then Gr(nr) = 3C/2. Thus, Gr(nr) is a decreasing function of np1.
p1
p2
p3j1
j2
Fig. 1. A case where the throughput of user r is not increasing in nr .
One interesting special case is that a user can only choose either zero or one connection on a given available
path. That is, (8) can be described as nrp ∈ {0, 1},∀rp ∈ Pr. In this case, each user only has finite number of
strategies. This variant of the game is a finite game. According to [22], this game admits a mixed strategy NE.
This NE is related to randomly choosing of connections to other peers in BitTorrent applications [3]. This is an
interesting future research topic.
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(a)
A
E
D B
C
(b)
Fig. 2. (a) is a grid network where squares represent links. (b) is an instance of (a). A→ E → B and C → D → A correspond to route
1 and 2 in (a). D → A→ E,E → F → D,C → F → B correspond to routes 3, 4, 5.
D. Existence of Multiple Nash Equilibria in Grid Network
In this section, we use a simple example to illustrate the unstructured file sharing game and possible NEs. The
network topology in this example is a so called grid network introduced in [10], shown in Figure 2.(a). A possible
instance of this grid network is called “fish” network, shown in Figure 2.(b).
A closed form rate allocation based on the α-bandwidth sharing mechanism for such a grid network is given in
[10]. Specifically, if there are K horizontal routes and L vertical routes, then the total throughput on horizontal
path p is given by
npyp =
(
∑K
k=1
1
RTTk
nαk )
1/α
(
∑K
k=1
1
RTTk
nαk )
1/α + (
∑L
l=1
1
RTTl
nαl )
1/α
(11)
where np denotes the number of flows on horizontal path p. yp is the throughput of a single flow on path p.
In the following, we discuss two variants of the game by considering two users playing the game on the grid
network. User 1 uses route 1 and user 2 uses route 2. Suppose α = 2 in (11), which corresponds to TCP. Suppose
that all vertical and horizontal routes have RTT of 50ms, and there are 10 background flows on all vertical routes.
Benefit includes throughput only. When both users are only concerned with total throughput and have no resource
limitations, we have identified the following case where there is a unique NE, at which both players open their
maximal allowable number of connections.
There are two users. User 1 uses the upper horizontal route and user 2 uses the lower horizontal route. Suppose
that user 2 opens 100 connections. In Figure 3, we plot the throughput of user 1 as a function of its number of
connections on its single available path. We find that the throughput of user 1 is neither a concave nor convex
function of its number of connections on its single available path. This suggests that the current results on the
existence of Nash equilibrium cannot be applied here because these results require the concavity of the utility
function [12][23].
However, note that the throughput of user 1 is an increasing function of n1, which can be verified by checking
its first-order derivative. Similarly, we can also show that user 2’s throughput is also an increasing function of its
number of connections. Therefore, if both users play the unstructured file sharing game, there is a unique NE.
Furthermore, at the NE both players opens their maximal allowable number of connections.
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Fig. 3. Total data rate G of user 1 as a function of the number of connections on its path, when user 2 has 100 connections.
Benefit includes both throughput and cost. In this variant of the game, not only is that Br neither a concave nor
a convex function of its number of connections nr, but Br is not always increasing in nr.
For example, suppose β = 0.0005 in the cost function Φ(nr). We plot in Figures 4 and 5 the benefit B of user
1 as a function of its number of connections on its single available route, given that the number of connections of
user 2 is 50 and 100 respectively. Note that, depending on the number of connections opened by user 2, the benefit
of user 1 can be either an increasing or a decreasing function of n1.
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Fig. 4. Benefit of user 1 as a function of the num-
ber of connections when user 2 has 50 connection.
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Fig. 5. Benefit of user 1 as a function of the num-
ber of connections when user 2 has 100 connection.
We define the best response n∗r of player r as the solution of r’s optimization problem given fixed strategies
of all other players n−r. In Figure 6, we plot the best response curves of both players. Note that there are three
intersecting points. An intersecting point is a NE because at that point, each user’s response is the best response to
the other user’s strategy. Thus, there are three NE in this game. For comparison, in the single link TCP connection
game [11], there is only one unique NE when the cost is proportional to the number of connections.
It is also interesting to note that these two players do not share any common link (Figure 2), so, their interaction
arises because they share links with other common sessions.
This simple example indicates that the interaction among multiple users on a general network topology can be
much more complex than the single link TCP connection game. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium
can depend on network topologies and the utility functions adopted by users.
In the following, we focus on two special networks: a parallel link network and a star network. Both can be used
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Fig. 6. Best response curves of both player 1 and player 2.
to model peer-to-peer networks.
IV. PARALLEL LINK NETWORK
In this section, we investigate an unstructured file sharing game on a parallel-link network where all users
share a common source and a common destination node interconnected by a number of parallel links. Parallel-link
networks can be used as simple models for unstructured file sharing. For example, in eDonkey networks [4], a peer
can download a file from multiple other peers providing this file. There are possibly many peers simultaneously
downloading the same file, and they can be thought of as associated with a common destination node. Each of
the file-providing peers can be thought of as a “link” or “path” connecting the common destination node with a
common super virtual file-providing source node. Those downloading peers compete for these parallel links/paths
for bandwidth. This scenario can be approximated by a parallel link network.
In this section, we first show the existence of stable network states (NEs) on a parallel-link network. We then
present the results on the efficiency loss of NE and the stability of NE in the best-response dynamics.
A. Nash equilibrium
Suppose that there are L links and R users. By an abuse of notation, we will use L and R to denote the set of
links and the set of users respectively. An example of a parallel link network is shown in Figure 7. The throughput
Grj obtained by user r on link j is given by the simple rate allocation mechanism introduced in the previous section:
Grj(nrj) = Cjnrj/RTTrj/(
∑R
k=1 nkj/RTTkj), where RTTrj is the Round Trip Time of user r on link/path j, Cj
is the capacity of link j, and nrj is the number of connections of user r on link j. The strategy of user r is a vector
of the number of connections on its available paths or links: nr = (nr1, ..., nrL) and nrj ∈ (0, nmaxr ], ∀j ∈ L. nmaxr
is the maximum allowable number of connections for user r. Note that this game is a continuous kernel game [12]
as we assume that a user’s strategy is a real-valued vector.
In this section, we only consider the case where Ur(nr) = Gr(nr). The benefit or payoff obtained by user r is:
Br(nr) = Gr(nr)− Φr(nr).
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Fig. 7. A parallel-link network topology.
We consider two scenarios: an unconstrained game and a constrained game. In an unconstrained game, there is
no upper limit on the total number of connections a user can open. In a constrained game, each user must choose
a certain total number of connections1. We have shown the existence of a unique NE in both constrained and
unconstrained games.
B. Unconstrained Game
In an unconstrained game, users essentially play an independent game on each distinct path/link. Since a NE
exists and is unique on a single link game [11], we know that a NE also exists and is unique on this parallel link
network. This is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: There exists a unique interior-point NE in an unstructured file sharing game on a parallel link
network.
Social Benefit at Nash equilibrium. As shown in [11], a single bottleneck link TCP connection game admits a
symmetric NE when users have the same Round Trip Times (RTT) and their benefit function includes throughput
and a cost proportional to the number of connections. This result can be extended to our uncontrained game. That
is, when all users have the same RTTs, the unique NE is symmetric, in the sense that all users have the same
number of connections at the NE.
Solving the optimization problem for a user r, we can get the vector of connections of user r at the symmetric
NE as:
n∗rj = (R− 1)Cj/(R2β).
Then, user r’s benefit at the NE is
B∗r =
L∑
j=1
Cj/R−
L∑
j=1
(R− 1)Cj/R2.
Therefore, the total social benefit of the NE is
Bne =
L∑
j=1
Cj/R.
1This is motivated by BitTorrent [3] where each peer always has 5 active connections open to 5 different other peers.
Note that Bne is not related to the cost of users. It is simply a function of the total network capacity and the
number of users. As the number of users increases, the total social benefit of the NE goes to zero.
Reaction functions. The reaction function of a user r is defined as the best response of user r as a function (if it
exists) of the total number of connections of all other users. A response of user r is nr = (nr1, nr2, ..., nrL). Since
in an unconstrained game users essentially play an independent game on each individual link, we can solve for a
user’s best response on each link separately. Specifically, for any link j, we have
n¯rj = argmaxnrj∈(0,∞)Brj(
R∑
k 6=r
nkj). (12)
For convenience, let n−rj denote
∑R
k 6=r nkj . It is easy to show that
n¯rj = f(n−rj) = −n−rj +
√
Cjn−rj/β. (13)
n¯rj is a continuous function of n−rj . We note that in order to guarantee that the best response of user r is an
interior point of its strategy space, we must have
n¯rj > 0 or n−rj < Cj/β. (14)
As shown in Section III-D, we can use reaction functions to identify NEs by checking the intersecting point(s)
of the reaction function (best response) curves of all players. We can also use reaction functions to investigate the
best-response dynamics of the game playing process, as discussed later.
Stability of NE in Best-response Dynamics. Suppose that users interact with each other using best-response in
a discrete time process, a so called best-response dynamics [12][11]. This process proceeds in discrete time steps
or rounds, and only one randomly chosen user makes a move at each round. Whenever a user makes a move, it
calculates its best response to other users’ numbers of connections which are determined in previous steps. That is,
the user who makes a move solves its optimization problem to maximize its benefit. If all users’ strategies converge
to or stabilize at some point ns as time goes to infinity, then ns is a NE, and it is globally stable. Regarding an
unstructured file sharing game on a parallel link network, we have the following stability result.
Theorem 2: The unique NE is globally stable in the two-player version of the unstructured file sharing game on
parallel link network when both players use best-response to play the game.
Proof: We want to show that the best response of a user is a concave function of the other player’s number
of connections. In the unconstrained game, users actually play independent games on different links. For a given
user r, the best response function or reaction function on link j is given by (13), and re-stated as follows:
n¯r,j = −n−r,j +
√
Cjn−r,j/β,
where n−r,j is the number of connections of all other users. It can be shown that
∂2n¯r,j/∂n
2
−r,j = (−1/4)
√
Cj/β · n−3/2−r,j ≤ 0.
Thus, the reaction function of user r is a concave function of number of connections of other users. Then, from
[24], we know that in a two-player version of the game, Nash equilibrium is globally stable.
Efficiency loss of Nash equilibrium
First note that the maximal system benefit is the solution of a straightforward optimization problem. The system
benefit can be represented as:
B =
R∑
r=1
Br =
R∑
r=1
L∑
j=1
Grj − β
R∑
r=1
L∑
j=1
nrj . (15)
We find that the maximal value of B is
Bmax =
L∑
j=1
Cj − βNmin. (16)
Consider a homogeneous network where all links have the same capacity. Then we have Bmax = LC − βL, as
we need at least one connection for each link in order to get the bandwidth of each link. The efficiency loss of a
NE is given by
Leff =
Bmax
Bne
=
LC − βL
LC/R
. (17)
This result essentially suggests that the efficiency loss of the unique NE is bounded. However, if L,C are fixed,
and let R → ∞, then Leff → ∞. This suggests that the system performance at NE can degrade arbitrarily if the
number of users becomes large.
Socially Responsible Users
Note that we can think of users as data senders in the game discussed above. Let the packet loss rate associated
with each link/path j be pj . Suppose that the packet sending rate of a TCP connection of user r on path/link j is
Trj . The throughput of this connection is given by Grj = Trj(1 − pj). Not all packets coming to bottleneck link
j are delivered. The network resources before link j are partially wasted because that they carry data at a higher
rate than the actual delivery rate of link j. Therefore we can think of this extra traffic as a cost to the network and
that is proportional to the packet sending rate Trj . A user is considered as socially responsible if his/her benefit
function includes this cost term. That is, we have Br(nr) = Grj − γ
∑L
i=1 nrjTrj , where γ ∈ (0, 1). Based on
[11], we can show that there exists a pure strategy unique NE because users actually play a game on each link
independently from other links. It also follows that the loss of efficiency of the NE is bounded as the unique NE
is an interior point in the strategy space. Note that the definition of loss of efficiency in unstructured file sharing
game is different from that of the single bottleneck link TCP connection game. The latter is defined as the ratio of
total sending rate from all users at NE over the minimum total sending rate. The latter is the efficiency loss from
network’s point of view, whereas the former is from user’s point of view.
C. Constrained Game
Consider another model where the total number of connections that are allowed to open by a user is fixed.
Formally, for any user r, we have
∑L
j xrj = nr, where nr is the required total number of connections.
We refer to this game as a constrained game. As summarized in the following theorem, this game admits a
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Please see Appendix II for the proof of this theorem.
Theorem 3: There exists a unique interior-point symmetric Nash equilibrium in a constrained unstructured file
sharing game in parallel-link network.
Remarks. It can be true that there are asymmetric NE. For example, suppose that there are two users and two links
with the same capacity, and each user is constrained to use two and only two connections. Then one NE is that
user 1 opens its two connections on link 1 and user 2 opens its two connections on link 2, or a NE could be that
user 1 opens its two connections on link 2, and user 2 opens its two connections on link 1.
An Illustrative Example for the existence and stability of NE. We use a simple example to illustrate the
Nash equilibrium proved in Theorem 3 . There are three users: A, B, and C. There are two paths (or two links)
in a parallel link topology. Suppose that the capacity of link 1 is C1 = 25Mbps and the capacity of link 2 is
C2 = 100Mbps. Suppose that each user has to open 20 connections. As proved in Theorem 3, at Nash equilibrium,
each user will open 4 and 16 connections on link 1 and 2 respectively, because n∗1/n∗2 = C1/C2 = 1/4. That is,
at Nash equilibrium we have, n∗A = n∗B = n∗C = (4, 16).
Suppose users interact with each other using best-response dynamics [12][11]. If all users’ strategies converge
to or stabilize at some points as time goes by, then the stablized numbers of connections are the Nash equilibrium
strategies for all users. As shown in Figure 8, the best-response dynamics indeed converges to a stable point which
corresponds to the Nash equilibrium obtained from the previous analysis.
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Fig. 8. An example of the best-response dynamics on two parallel links. This dynamic process converges to Nash equilibrium. The left
figure shows the benefit of three users. The right figure shows the numbers of connections.
Loss of Efficiency. Given the constraint that the total number of connections of user r should be equal to nr, the
maximal value of (15) is given by Bmax =
∑L
j=1Cj − β
∑R
r=1 nr. The system optimal performance is exactly the
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Fig. 10. A three node topology.
same as the system performance at Nash equilibrium. Then, the Nash equilibrium has no efficiency loss, that is,
Leff = 1.
V. STAR NETWORK
In this section, we use a star network to approximately model a peer-to-peer file sharing overlay network, and
investigate the unstructured file sharing game on such a star network. Figure 9 presents one such example.
In the star network, we assume that a user has two asymmetric access links to the Internet: one downstream
link and one upstream link. This assumption is supported in a measurement study in [25], where it is found that
most users in current peer-to-peer networks use cable modem or ADSL to get connected to the Internet. Usually
the downstream link has higher capacity than the upstream link [25].
A user r uses its downstream link to get data from other peers. The downstream link of user r is a “private” link
in the sense that this link is only used by user r itself. On the other hand, the upstream link of user r is shared by
all other peers or users who are downloading files from user r. We can think of the upstream link of user r as a
“public” link from the point of view of user r.
In addition, similar to [14][15], we assume that in a peer-to-peer file sharing network, bottlenecks can occur at
access links, not in the core Internet. This assumption is a reasonable approximation of the current peer-to-peer file
sharing networks such as Gnutella and BitTorrent, where usually the data throughput is limited by the “last mile”
(cable or ADSL or modem) of a connection. Thus, in the star network shown in Figure 9, the Internet cloud can
be represented simply as a central node.
In the following, we first prove the existence of NE in unstructured file sharing game on a star network. We
then use examples to illustrate the best response dynamics of this game playing process, and finally we present our
results on the loss of efficiency of NE.
A. Nash Equilibrium
Recall that the benefit of user r is given by (1). In the following, we first present a lemma (Lemma 1) and later
use it to prove that a utility function2 Ur(Gr(nr)) is a non-decreasing, continuous, and concave function of user
r’s number of connections nr = (nr1, ..., nrPr), where Pr represents the set of available paths of user r and the
number of paths as well. Since we assume that cost Φr(nr) is an increasing and convex function of nr, it then
follows that the benefit Br is a non-decreasing, continuous, and concave function of nr.
Lemma 1 is introduced for the simple network in Figure 10, where a user r has two paths (A → C → D and
B → C → D) to transfer data to destination node D. Both paths share a common link CD. Suppose that the
number of connections user r opens on path A→ C → D is np1, and on path B → C → D is np2. Then we have
nr = (np1, np2).
We assume that link CD is a private link of user r, i.e., no other users use this link. This private link corresponds
to the downstream link of user r in a star network. On the other hand, links AC and BC are shared by user r and
other users. AC and BC correspond to two public links of user r in a star network.
Recall that throughput Gr obtained by user r is a function of nr. Lemma 1 shows that Gr is a concave function
of nr.
Lemma 1: Throughput Gr of user r in Figure 10 is a concave function of nr = (np1, np2).
Proof: The strategy vector of user r is nr = (np1, np2). Let z = np1C1np1+n−r1 +
np2C2
np2+n−r2
.
Then, the throughput obtained by user r is
G(np1, np2) =
 C3 , if z ≥ C3z , if z ≤ C3 (18)
First, we note that this function is continuous and increasing. Second, this function has two parts, with each part
being a concave function. Now we want to show that this function is a concave function of nr everywhere in its
domain.
Take any two points n1 and n2. Without loss of generality, we assume that n1 satisfies z ≤ C3 and that n2
satisfies z ≥ C3, as shown in Figure 11. We would like to show that
G(δn1 + (1− δ)n2) ≥ δG(n1) + (1− δ)G(n2), δ ∈ [0, 1].
If we connect points n1 and n2 with a line, then this line intersects with the boundary of region z ≥ C3 at point
n0. Then we have,
G(δn1 + (1− δ)n2) ≥ G(δn1 + (1− δ)n0) (19)
≥ δG(n1) + (1− δ)G(n0) (20)
= δG(n1) + (1− δ)G(n2) (21)
2Ur(x) is assumed to be continuous, nondecreasing, and concave.
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Fig. 11. The domain of Gr , the throughput of user r, can be divided into two regions. One region is z ≥ C3, and the other region is
z ≤ C3.
(19) is true because that G(x) is an increasing function of x, and δn1 + (1− δ)n2 ≥ δn1 + (1− δ)n0. (20) is
true because function G is a concave function in region z ≤ C3. (21) is true because function G is a continuous
function.
An illustrative example. In Figure 10, suppose we choose 6bps as capacities for links A → C and B → C and
2bps for link C → D. User r wants to open some number of connections on paths A → C → D (path 1) and
B → C → D (path 2) to transfer data from A and B to destination node D. The numbers of connections or
sessions from other users on links AC and BC are 100. We vary the numbers of connections from user r on path 1
and 2, and then compute the throughput received by user r. As shown in Figure 12, we see that user r’s throughput
is indeed a concave function.
50 100
50
100
0.5
1
1.5
2
path 2
path 1 20
40
60
80
100
20
40
60
80
100
1
2
path 1path 2
Fig. 12. Throughput Gr of user r as a function of the number of connections on both paths. The left figure is a side view. The right figure
is a top view.
Consider the network in Figure 13, a generalized version of the network in Figure 10. In Figure 13, there are M
(multiple) paths along which user r can get data from the sender. All paths share a common link BA. A strategy
vector of user r is nr = (nr1, nr2, ..., nrM ) with M ≥ 2. We can extend the result in Lemma 1 to show that a user
r’s throughput is also a concave function of nr. This is summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Suppose that user r has M (M ≥ 2) paths in the network shown in Figure 13, then the throughput
B A
C
D
Fig. 13. A network where a user has multiple paths (or peers) to get data.
of user r is a concave function of its strategy vector nr = (nr1, nr2, ..., nrM ).
Based on Lemma 2, we can show in the following theorem the existence of NE on a star network. One example
of such star network is shown in Figure 9.
Theorem 4: There exists a Nash equilibrium of unstructured overlay game on a star network (shown in Figure
9).
Proof: According to Lemma 2, each user r’s total throughput is a concave function of the vector of number
of connections nr. Then it is easy to show that user r’s benefit or payoff function Br is a concave function of nr.
In addition, Br is continuous in n. Thus we have a multi-player concave game. Based on the result in [23], we
conclude that Nash equilibrium exists in this game.
An illustrative example. We use a simple star network shown in Figure 14 to illustrate the existence of NE proved
in Theorem 4. On this star network, there are 6 links AD,DA,BD,DB,CD, and DC. The capacities of all links
are CAD = 10, CDA = 20, CBD = 30, CDB = 40, CCD = 50, and CDC = 60. There are three users associated
with nodes A,B and C respectively. For convenience, we refer to the user at node A as user A. Note that each
user has two download paths with each path consisting of two links. For example, user A has two download paths
B → D → A and C → D → A. For any given download path, one link is shared with other users, and the other
link is a private link. For example, for user A, path B → D → A has two links: BD and DA. Link BD is a link
shared with user C. Link DA is a private link of user A, which is shared by both of its paths B → D → A and
C → D → A.
User A’s strategy is a vector of number of connections on two available paths, i.e., nA = (nBA, nCA). Similarly,
strategies of user B and C are: nB = (nAB, nCB) and nC = (nAC , nBC).
Consider the unstructured file sharing game played by users A,B, and C. Each user tries to maximize its benefit
Br (r = A,B,C). We use best response dynamics to demonstrate the existence of a NE in this game. At the first
step, each user opens a random number of connections on two available paths. In the following steps, only one
player is randomly chosen to compute its best response at each step. As shown in Figure 14, the best response
dynamics converges to a NE, which can be verified by checking the optimality of benefits of all three users.
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Fig. 14. The left figure shows a simple star topology with three users A, B, and C. The right figure shows the best response dynamics. All
three users’ benefits converge to the Nash equilibrium.
B. Loss of Efficiency
Consider the case where all downstream links have higher capacity than upstream links and users are homo-
geneous. We can show that in this case, the loss of efficiency of any NE in the game is bounded. However, if
users are aggressive in the sense that their benefit functions do not contain cost terms, then a unique NE is a point
where all users open their maximum allowable number of connections. Clearly, the loss of efficiency of the NE is
unbounded if users can open arbitrarily large numbers of connections. In order to show these results, we need to
do a simple transformation as described below.
In the star topology shown in Figure 9, if all users’ private downstream links have much higher capacities than
the upstream links of those other peers, then this game can be thought of a variant of the game on a parallel link
network. For example, we can transform the simple star network in the left sub-figure of Figure 14 into Figure 15.
Center node D in Figure 14 is decomposed into six interconnected virtual nodes DAd, DAu, DBd, DBu, DCd, DCu.
Links between these six virtual nodes have infinite capacity. Node A is decomposed into nodes Adown and Aup.
Link DAdAdown represents the downstream link of node A. Link AupDAu represents the upstream link of node A.
Other links have similar interpretations.
Adown
DAd DAu
Aup
Bdown
DBd DBu
Bup
Cdown
DCd DCu
Cup
Fig. 15. Transformation of star network into equivalent parallel link network.
Based on the transformation illustrated in Figure 15, the result for the loss of efficiency at NE on a parallel link
network can be applied to a star network. That is, the loss of efficiency at NE of the unstructured file sharing game
can be arbitrarily large if the number of users becomes large in this special case.
We also consider another special case where users are aggressive in the sense that users do not have cost constraint
and only care about their throughputs [11]. That is, user’s benefit function is represented as: Br(nr) = Gr(nr). In
this special case, there exist a unique Nash equilibrium where all users open their maximum allowable number of
connections, and the price of anarchy can be unbounded when users can open arbitrary large number of connections.
Network Resource Utilization. Suppose that all downstream links have higher capacities than upstream links. Then
the capacities of all upstream links will be fully utilized at the NE. This is a good situation in terms of the network
resource utilization because the total throughput can be supported by the network is just the aggregate capacity of
these upstream links. Note that this is not always true for general network topologies, which is demonstrated in an
example in Appendix III. A similar example is given in [26].
VI. OVERLAY FORMATION GAME
In this section, we introduce an overlay formation game to study the Tit-for-Tat strategy adopted by BitTorrent
(BT) [3], one of the most popular peer-to-peer applications.
As before, we assume that the physical network is a star network where each peer is attached to a physical node,
and the center node models the Internet, and peers connect to the center node via access links. However, unlike
the last section, here we assume that bottlenecks only occur at upstream access links. As before, we assume that
peers always have demands that can be satisfied by each other, and that connections are always allowed.
A connection between a pair of peers can be thought of as a virtual link. Through setting up connections
between themselves, peers form an overlay network, in which each node represents a unique peer, and virtual links
are connections between peers. A peer i can get a share of the upload bandwidth (BW) of peer j through the
connection (or virtual link) between i and j. In the mean time, other peers may want to get some share of peer j’s
upload BW by setting up connections with j. The upload BW of j is equally shared among all connections with
other peers. Note that a peer may want to get BW shares of all other peers’ upload BW and want to maximize its
received total BW. If all peers behave this way, we have a game among peers, and any stable point of this game is
an overlay network consisting of a set of virtual links among peer nodes. We call this game an overlay formation
game.
We can think of the overlay formation game as a variant of an unstructured file sharing game with two major
unique characteristics: 1) two peers set up a connection between themselves only when they both find it beneficial;
2) there can only be zero or one connection between a pair of peers. The first characteristic captures the reciprocation
feature of the so called Tit-for-Tat strategy in BitTorrent (BT) protocol [3]. According to Tit-for-Tat strategy each
peer uploads to the nu peers (the default value is 4) from which it can download at the highest rate, i.e., its best
uploaders.
The Tit-for-Tat strategy is generally considered robust. To the best of our knowledge, the only analytical support
for this belief is in [14]. The authors of [14] study how Tit-for-Tat can affect selfish peers who are able to set their
upload bandwidth in a BT network. Under several assumptions, they show that there is a good NE at which each
peer uploads at the maximum rate. Note that in [14], for a given peer, the total number of other peers to set up a
connection with is fixed. However, we observe that BT clients can change the number of connections to open in
order to gain advantage or to improve their performance. We illustrate this observation in the following example.
An Illustrative Example. Consider 10 peers divided into two groups. Five peers have physical upload bandwidth
C1 = 3 and the other five have bandwidth C2 = 2. Suppose that the default number of connections is nu = 3.
According to [14], peers would use all their upload bandwidth and would create the overlay shown in Figure 16,
where big circles and small circle respectively represent high-bandwidth and low bandwidth peers. Note that the
peers do not receive the same download rate, even if they belong to the same group. Four high-bandwidth peers
receive a download rate of 3 (= 3C1/3), while the peer connecting the two groups (peer S in the figure) receives
only 8/3 (= 2C1/3 + C2/3). Similarly four low-bandwidth peers receive rates of 2, while the other receives 7/3.
According to [14] the formed overlay network is stable in the sense that no peer wants to change a link (or reduces
its uploading rate).
Let us now remove the constraint on the number of connections. For example, peer S decides to increase its
number of connections to 5. If all other peers keep nu = 3, the new equilibrium is presented in Figure 17. Note
that peer S improves its performance, because its download rate increases from 8/3 to 10/3 (= 5C2/3).
S
Fig. 16. Regular Graph.
S
Fig. 17. Peers can change numbers of connections.
This example shows that peers can benefit by changing their numbers of connections. This is formally supported
by a result in Section VI-B.1 regarding a homogeneous network where all peers have the same capacity. In the
rest of this section, we first formally introduce the overlay formation game in which peers act selfishly as player
S. We then study the network equilibria arising in this game and quantify the loss of efficiency using the analytical
framework of network formation games [20].
A. Model of Overlay Formation Game
We formally introduce the overlay formation game in this section. Assumptions are detailed in the previous
section. We refer to peers as players and to connections as links. As before, let R = {1, 2, · · · , R} denote the
set of players. The strategy of a player i is the set of intended connections player i wants to establish, which is
denoted by si = {si,j | j ∈ R\{i}}, where si,j = 1 means that player i intends to create a link (open a connection)
with player j and si,j = 0 means that player i does not intend to create such a link. With the Tit-for-Tat strategy,
both players have to agree in order to create a link, hence a link between players i and j is formed if and only
if si,j = sj,i = 1. A strategy profile s = {s1, s2, · · · , sR} therefore induces a network g(s) = {gi,j , i, j ∈ R},
where gi,j = 1 denotes the existence of link (i, j) and gi,j = 0 denotes the absence of link (i, j). Given a network
g, we use g + gi,j or g − gi,j to denote the network obtained by adding or severing the link (i, j). We also let
Ni(g) = {j ∈ R : j 6= i, gi,j = 1} be the set of player i’s neighbors in graph g, and let ni(g) = |Ni(g)|. A network
is symmetric if ni(g) = n,∀i ∈ R, i.e. all players have the same number of connections, also known as a regular
graph.
The payoff or benefit of player i is given by its download rate minus the cost of opening connections: Bi =
Gi − Φi(ni) =
∑
j∈Ni(g)Cj/nj − Φi(ni). As before, we assume that Φi is a convex function of ni. The marginal
benefit for player i to open a new connection with player j is:
bi(ni(g), nj(g)) = Bi(g + gi,j)−Bi(g)
=
Cj
nj(g) + 1
− Φi(ni(g) + 1) + Φi(ni(g)).
A connection between two players can be set up only when both of them find this connection beneficial. This
coordination requirement makes the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) partially inadequate. To address this issue,
the idea of NE has been supplemented with the requirement of pairwise stability [27], described below.
Definition 1: A network g is a pairwise equilibrium network (PEN) if the following conditions hold: 1) there is
a NE strategy profile which supports g; 2) for gi,j = 0, Bi(g + gi,j) > Bi(g)⇒ Bj(g + gi,j) < Bj(g).
B. Equilibria in Homogeneous Networks
In this section we consider homogeneous networks in which all peers have the same upload capacity and payoff
function.
1) Overlay Network Characterization: Based on the previous assumptions, our game is the local spillovers game
with strategic substitutes properties studied in [28]. Some of the following results (Theorems 5, 6 and 8) can be
derived from [28]. Please see Appendix IV for details.
Theorem 5: If the number of players is even, a symmetric PEN always exists. Specifically, if b(0, 0) ≤ 0, the
empty network is a PEN; if b(r−2, r−2) ≥ 0, the complete network is a PEN; if b(k, k) ≤ 0 ≤ b(k−1, k−1), the
regular graph with degree k is a PEN. When the previous inequalities are strict, the degree of the PEN is unique.
Remarks. First, note that for a set of R players or nodes, if R is even, we can expect a PEN to be a symmetric or
regular graph of any possible degree from 0 to R− 1; this is not true when the number of players is odd. Second,
this theorem states that the degree of a PEN can be determined by considering only the marginal benefit b(k, k)
for a pair of nodes with the same number of connections k, and in particular this degree is the smallest value k
that makes b(k, k) negative. Third, the symmetric network at equilibrium is not necessarily connected. Figure 18
shows two possible equilibria with r = 8 players and degree k = 2. Finally, even when a symmetric network can
arise from player interaction according to Theorem 5, the degree of the network is in general different from the
default value used in current BitTorrent implementation (nu = 4). This means that the symmetric network created
by compliant peers in BitTorrent networks is not in general a PEN for our overlay formation game.
Fig. 18. Different Pairwise Symmetric Equilibria.
Besides symmetric PENs discussed in the above, we have the following theorem addressing asymmetric PENs.
Theorem 6: There can be at most one player or node not connected to any other players in a PEN and the rest
of the network is a symmetric network of a unique degree. In asymmetric networks with a single component, if
two players with the same number of connections k (i.e. two nodes with the same degree k) are connected to each
other, then any two players with fewer number of links than k (or two nodes with lower degrees than k) must be
mutually connected.
Remarks. First, this property rules out two or more isolated players and interlinked stars with two or more central
players, but does allow a star to arise in equilibrium3. Note that for file sharing purposes, an overlay with a star
topology is very inefficient: the operation falls back to the server-client paradigm with the center of the star acting
as the server. Second, in some cases symmetric and asymmetric networks can be pairwise equilibria for a given set
of link capacities and cost functions (see [28] for examples).
The following theorem (not derived from [28]) shows some other restrictions as regards asymmetric networks
when the marginal benefit for player i to open a connection with player j only depends on the number of connections
of players i and j (as in our case). This new result rules out also star topologies. Please see Appendix V for a
detailed proof.
Theorem 7: In a scenario where a unique degree -h- is possible for the symmetric PENs, there can be at most h
3An interlinked star network has a maximally connected group and a minimally connected group of players. In addition, the maximally
connected players are connected to all players while the minimally connected group has links only with the players in the maximally
connected set.
players with degree smaller than h. Say l the number of players with degree smaller than h, there can be at most
(h − l)l players with degree bigger than h, each of them with degree at most h + l. If the cost function is linear
then there are no players with degree bigger than h.
Remark. Note that the degree of symmetric PENs h depends only on the cost function Φ() and the capacity C,
and is independent from the number of players R. Hence the distance between a PEN and a symmetric PEN is
bounded and becomes less significant as the number of players R increases. Formally:
lim
R→∞
1
R
E
{
R∑
i=1
|ni(gPEN )− h|
}
= 0.
Similarly the average payoff per player in a PEN converges to that of a symmetric PEN.
The following result shows that players having more connections gain higher payoffs than other players, sup-
porting the example introduced at the beginning of this section.
Theorem 8: Let g be a pairwise equilibrium network in which ni(g) < nj(g). If ∀u ∈ Ni(g), ∃v ∈ Nj(g) s.t. nu =
nv, then Bi(g) < Bj(g).
Note that if player i’s neighborhood is included in player j’s neighborhood (Ni ⊂ Nj), the condition, “∀u ∈ Ni(g),
∃v ∈ Nj(g), s.t. nu = nv”, is satisfied.
2) Loss of Efficiency of Symmetric Equilibria: In our game, given the number of players, the number of possible
overlays players can create is finite. Hence there is one network gopt with the highest total payoff
∑
i∈RBi(gopt).
We define the efficiency loss of a PEN g as the ratio of the highest total payoff over the total payoff of the PEN:
Leff (r, C,Φ) =
∑
i∈RBi(gopt)∑
i∈RBi(g)
.
We note that Leff depends in general on the number of players, and the upload capacities and cost functions of
those players. The following theorem states that Leff is unbounded even for the class of linear connection cost
functions (Φ(n) = αn). Therefore, the price of anarchy (the worst efficiency loss of all NEs) is infinite4. Please
see Appendix VI for a detailed proof.
Theorem 9: For the class of linear connection cost functions, the loss of efficiency is unbounded. In particular,
given an even number of players and an upload capacity C, ∀M ∈ R, ∃α∗ ∈ R+ s.t. Leff (r, C,Φ∗) > M , where
Φ∗(n) = α∗n.
C. Dynamic Models
We investigate in this section how peers can dynamically reach a PEN. Here we consider linear costs (Φ(ni) =
αni). We consider the following dynamic discrete-time process. Starting from an empty network, at each time a
player pair (i,j) is randomly chosen. Link (i, j) is created (or kept) if both players find it beneficial. An existing
4This is different from what happens for selfish routing, where the price of anarchy is finite, and independent from the network topology
for networks in which edge latency does not depend in a highly nonlinear fashion on the edge congestion [29].
link is removed if at least one of the two players of that link does not find it useful. We are going to show that
this dynamic process always reaches a PEN.
Let us introduce some terminology according to [20]. A network g′ is adjacent to a network g if g′ = g+ gi,j or
g′ = g−gi,j for some pair (i, j). A network g′ defeats another network g if either g′ = g−gi,j and Bi(g′) > Bi(g),
or if g′ = g+ gi,j with Bi(g′) ≥ Bi(g) and Bj(g′) ≥ Bj(g) with at least one inequality holding strictly. A network
game exhibits no indifference if for any two adjacent networks, one defeats the other.
According to this terminology in the dynamic process we described above, the current network is altered if and
only if the addition or deletion of a link would defeat the current network. The process leads to an improving
path, i.e. a sequence of networks g1, g2, ..., gK where each network gk is defeated by the subsequent (adjacent)
network gk+1. There are two kind of improving paths: those exhibiting cycles (which have infinite length) and
those terminating with a PEN (called stable state). The following lemma (a theorem in [30]) characterizes when
there are no cycles and pairwise stable networks exist.
Lemma 3: Given G the set of all the possible networks g, if there exists a real valued function w : G→ R such
that “g′ defeats g” if and only if “w(g′) > w(g) and g′ and g are adjacent”, then there are no cycles. Conversely,
if the network game exhibits no indifference, then there are no cycles only if there exists a function w : G → R
such that “g′ defeats g” if and only if “w(g′) > w(g) and g′ and g are adjacent”.
Based on this lemma, we have the following result.
Theorem 10: If the connection cost function is a linear function Φ(n) = αn, the dynamic process introduced at
the beginning of Section VI-C always reaches a PEN.
Sketch of the proof. If h ∈ {0, 1, · · · , R − 1} is the degree of a symmetric equilibrium according to Theorem 5
and b(h, h) < 0 for h 6= R− 1, the following function w : G→ R:
w(g) = −
R∑
i=1
f(ni),
where
f(ni) =
 h− ni if h ≥ niR(ni − h) otherwise
satisfies the relation in Lemma 3 for our overlay formation game, hence the dynamic process always reaches a
PEN. If h 6= R − 1 and b(h, h) = 0, then in a PEN there can be also nodes with degree h + 1 (as well as nodes
with degrees 0, 1, · · · , h), in this case the following function can be considered:
f(ni) =
 h− ni if h ≥ niR(ni − (h+ 1)) otherwise
The details of the proof are in Appendix VIII.
Simulations. We present some simulation results. We considered a number of players ranging from 100 to 10000
and α = 0.245, for which the degree of a symmetric PEN is 4. For each setting we simulated 5000 runs of the
above dynamic process. Each run terminates with a PEN. We denote the average degree for this PEN over all
players as davg.
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Figure 19 shows the minimum and the mean of davg over all the runs. We see that as R increases both the mean
and the minimum converge to 4. This result confirms Theorem 7: as R increases the PENs converge to a symmetric
one.
In Figure 20, the mean and the minimum of the total benefit are compared with the highest total benefit, which
can be directly evaluated from the results in Appendix VII. This figure shows also the convergence of the payoffs
of all PENs to the payoff of the symmetric PEN when R increases.
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Fig. 21. Number of iterations per peer.
In addition, we present the number of iterations per peer in Figure 21. We observe that the average number of
iterations to reach a PEN is of the order of R2 and hence the number of iteration per peer is of the order of R.
Let us consider this number of iterations in the context of BitTorrent (BT) [3]. Each peer in a BT network tries
to replace an existing connection with a new, better connection every 10 seconds. All peers do such replacement
simultaneously, unlike the sequential replacement in our simulations. So R2 iterations in our simulations corresponds
to 10R seconds in a BT network. For a population of 100 peers, the time needed to reach a PEN is of the order of
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Fig. 23. Convergence to the PEN: the benefit.
about 17 minutes, which is typically faster than the average time between changes in the population of peers (due
to arrivals or departures). Figure 22 shows how the average and minimum degrees change during two simulation
runs respectively for R = 100 and for R = 1000. The initial values are equal to 0 and converge to 4. The time
scale represents time in a BT network; namely, R iterations are represented by 10s. We can observe that: 1) with
this time scale the evolution of the average degree seems independent from the number of players; 2) the network
converges quite rapidly to the PEN. In particular, the average degree reaches 3.8, i.e. 95% of the final value, after
less than 80 seconds in both cases, or, equivalently, after less than 800 iterations for R = 100 and less than 8000
for R = 1000.
Finally Figure 23 shows the time evolution of the process as regards the total benefit. We can note that for both
runs, as the process begins the total benefit grows because of the high benefit of the initial connections, while it
falls down to the expected value when the network approaches the equilibrium.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Motivated by unstructured file sharing networks such as BitTorrent [3], we introduced an unstructured file sharing
game and an overlay formation game to model the interaction among self-interested users who can open multiple
connections on multiple paths to accelerate data transfer. Users are modelled as players, and each user adjusts its
numbers of connections on its available paths to maximize its benefit.
We demonstrated by examples that there exist multiple stable network states, so called Nash equilibria (NE), in
the unstructured file sharing game on general networks. We further restrict our attention to parallel link networks
and star networks which are used to model unstructured file sharing networks. We proved the existence of NE in
several variants of the game on both networks. We found that the loss of efficiency of NE can be arbitrarily large
if users have no cost constraints. However, when there are cost constraints, the loss of efficiency is bounded. In
addition, we proved the global stability of NE in some variants of the game. Furthermore, we studied the Tit-for-
Tat strategy (built in BitTorrent [3]) through an overlay formation game. We proved the existence of equilibrium
overlays, and demonstrated the convergence of the dynamical game-playing process. Although the general belief is
that the Tit-for-Tat can prevent selfish behavior, we showed that it can still lead to an unbounded loss of efficiency.
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APPENDIX I
AN EXAMPLE FOR THE SIMPLE RATE ALLOCATION MECHANISM
This example is to show that the simple rate allocation mechanism in Section III-B cannot be extended to a
general network.
Suppose that there are two paths p1 and p2 which belong to two user r1 and r2 respectively. These two paths
share a single common link l. Let user r1 open n1p1 number of connections on p1 and user 2 open n2p2 number
of connections on p2.
Suppose that
∀m ∈ p1,m 6= l, Cmn1p1/
∑
w∈R
nwm > Cln1p1/(n1p1 + n2p2).
Here, nwm represents the number of connections opened by user w on link m.
If we conclude that
y1p1 = Cln1p1/(n1p1 + n2p2),
then we might be wrong. The reason is as follows.
It is possible that there is a link k on p2 satisfying
k ∈ p2, k 6= l, Ckn2p2/
∑
w∈R
nwk ≤ Cjn2p2/
∑
w∈R
nwj , ∀j ∈ p2,
then user r2’s obtained rate is
Ckn2p2/
∑
w∈R
nwk,
and the actual allocated rate of user r2 on link l is Ckn2p2/
∑
w∈R nwk.
If we have
Cmn1p1/
∑
w∈R
nwm > Cl − Ckn2p2/
∑
w∈R
nwk
> Cln1p1/(n1p1 + n2p2)
then, the actual rate obtained by user 1 is
Cl − Ckn2p2/
∑
w∈R
nwk,
not
Cln1p1/(n1p1 + n2p2).
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Consider the Lagrangian of the constrained optimization problem of any given user r.
L(nr) = Br(nr) + λ(nr −
L∑
j=1
nrj).
The optimal solution can be obtained by solving the following equations.
∂L/∂nrj = 0, ∀j (22)
∂L/∂λ = 0 (23)
That is,
∂L/∂nrj =
∑R
k 6=r nkj
(nrj +
∑R
k 6=r nkj)2
Cj − β − λ = 0 (24)
∂L/∂λ = nr −
L∑
j=1
nrj = 0 (25)
We consider a symmetric Nash equilibrium where all users have the same number of connections on each
path/link. Then, we get
Ci/n
∗
ri = Cj/n
∗
rj , ∀i, j
Combined with
∑L
j=1 n
∗
rj = nr, we can get the vector of number of flows at Nash equilibrium. Specifically, for a
given user r, its number of connections at link j at Nash equilibrium is given by n∗rj = nrCj/
∑L
k=1Ck.
APPENDIX III
AN EXAMPLE FOR UNDER-UTILIZED NETWORK RESOURCES DUE TO SELFISH BEHAVIOR OF USERS.
In the triangle network shown in Figure 24, consider that all links are bi-directional and all links have the same
capacity C. We have CAB = CBA = CAC = CCA = CBC = CCB = C. There are six users:
• User AB wants to transfer data from node A to node B.
• User BA wants to transfer data from node B to node A.
• User BC wants to transfer data from node B to node C.
• User CB wants to transfer data from node C to node B.
• User AC wants to transfer data from node A to node C.
• User CA wants to transfer data from node C to node A.
Consider that each user has two paths to transfer data and it can only open at most one connection on each path.
For clarity, in Figure 24, we only show connections opened by user AB and user BA. Assume that all users try
to maximize its total throughput, then at the NE, every user opens one connection on each of its two paths. Each
user gets a total throughput of 2C/3(= C/3+C/3). Then, the total throughput from all six users is 4C. However,
the total capacity provided by the network is 6C. Thus, the network resource is not fully utilized in this example.
A similar example is given in [26].
A
B C
Fig. 24. Triangle Network.
APPENDIX IV
PROOFS OF THEOREMS 5, 6 AND 8
The theorems are derived from results in [28], in particular from Proposition 4.4, from the remarks about the
characterization of asymmetric equilibria after Proposition 4.4 and from Proposition 4.5. In this section we just
show that we can apply those results to our problem.
In section 4 of [28] the authors define a local spillovers game as a network game where aggregate gross payoff
of player i can be written as:
pii(g) = Ψ1(ηi(g)) +
∑
j∈Ni(g)
Ψ2(ηj(g)) +
∑
j /∈Ni(g)
Ψ3(ηj(g)),
where ηi(g) is the number of links of player i in graph g (ni(g) according to our notation).
We can recognize the same benefit function of our overlay formation game where:
Ψ1(ni) is the cost of opening ni connections (−Φ(ni)),
Ψ2(nj) is the downloading rate user i receives from a peer with nj connections (C/nj),
Ψ3() is identically null.
In our game Φ() is a convex function and the downloading rate is a decreasing function of nj . Hence according
to the terminology of [28] our aggregate payoff function “satisfies the local spillovers property, concavity in own
links (Ψ1() is concave) and strategic substitutability (Ψ2(k + 1) − Ψ3(k + 1) < Ψ2(k) − Ψ3(k + 1))”. In this
case Proposition 4.4 about symmetric equilibria, remarks about the characterization of asymmetric equilibria after
Proposition 4.4 and Proposition 4.5 about payoff distribution hold.
APPENDIX V
PROOF OF THEOREM 7
The result does not depend on the specific form of the payoff function we considered, it holds when the aggregate
payoff function satisfies the local spillover property, concavity in own links and strategic substitutability and the
marginal benefit depends only on the number of connections of players i and j, i.e., when Ψ3() is identically null.
If h is the degree of symmetric PENs, b(h − 1, h − 1) > 0 and b(h, h) < 0. The marginal benefit b(ni, nj) =
Ψ1(ni + 1) − Ψ1(ni) + Ψ2(nj + 1) is a decreasing function of ni (because Ψ1() is concave) and of nj (because
of strategic substitutability). Hence b(u, v) ≥ b(h − 1, h − 1) > 0 for u, v < h. As a consequence, given a PEN,
all the players with degree smaller than h are mutually connected and their number is at most h (otherwise their
degree would be at least h).
Say l the number of players with degree smaller than h. They can have at most h− 1 connections and they are
mutually connected, i.e. they have l − 1 connections with other players with less than h connections. Hence, they
can have at most (h− 1)− (l− 1) = h− l connections with players which have at least h connections. Therefore
the number of players with more than h connections is bounded by (h− l)l (< h2).
If the cost function is linear all the nodes have degree at most h. In fact in this case b(ni, nj) depends only on
nj (b(ni, nj) = C/(nj + 1)− α = b(nj)). If nj ≥ h, b(nj) ≥ b(h) < 0, no player would create a connection with
a player that has already h connections or more.
The remark after Theorem 7 follows from the fact that in a PEN the number of nodes with degree different from
h is bounded by h+ (h− l)l ≤ h+ h2 and that for each of these nodes the difference between its degree and h is
bounded by h and by h+ l < 2h, respectively for players with less than h connections and for players with more
than h connections5.
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Without loss of generality we can assume that C = 1.
Given R > 2 players and a symmetric equilibria g with degree k ∈ {2, ..., R − 2}, let us consider the network
g˜ where all the players have degree equal to one6. It holds:
Leff =
∑
i∈RBi(gopt)∑
i∈RBi(g)
≥
≥
∑
i∈RBi(g˜)∑
i∈RBi(g)
=
=
∑R
i=1 1− Φ(1)∑R
i=1
(∑R
j∈Ni
1
k
)
− Φ(k)
=
=
R(1− Φ(1))
R(1− Φ(k)) =
1− Φ(1)
1− Φ(k)
If the connection cost Φ(n) is a linear function (Φ(n) = αn), in order to support an equilibrium with degree k
we can consider α such that 1/(k + 1) < α < 1/k (Theorem 5). We can choose α = 1/k(1 − ²) with ² > 0. In
this case
Leff =
1− Φ(1)
1− Φ(k) =
=
1− α
1− αk =
=
1− (1− ²)/k
²
,
and the loss of efficiency is clearly unbounded.
APPENDIX VII
OPTIMAL NETWORKS
In this section we characterize the networks with the highest global payoff for our overlay formation game. We
observe that in the homogenous scenario the global payoff BS =
∑
i∈RBi does not change when we permute the
players, because we are simply changing their labels. Without loss of generality we consider Φ(0) = 0
Theorem 11: If C ≤ Φ(1), the empty network is an optimal network. If C ≥ Φ(1) and R is even a symmetric
network with degree one is an optimal network. If C ≥ Φ(1), R is odd and C ≤ Φ(2) a network with all the nodes
with degree one but one with degree zero is an optimal network. If C ≥ Φ(1), R is odd and C ≥ Φ(2) a network
5Here we want to show the existence of bounds independent from R, not to determine tight bounds.
6In Appendix VII we prove that network g˜ is a network with the optimal payoff, but this is not necessary for this proof.
with all the nodes with degree one but one with degree two is an optimal network. When the previous inequalities
are strict the optimal networks differ only for a permutation of the players.
First we note that the global payoff BS can be expressed as follows:
BS(g) =
∑
i∈R
Bi(g) =
=
∑
i∈R
∑
j∈Ni
(
C
nj(g)
− Φ(ni(g))
)
=
=
∑
i∈R:
ni(g)≥1
C −
∑
i∈R
Φ(ni(g)) =
=
∑
i∈R:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(ni(g))) . (26)
If C ≤ Φ(1) then the empty (network g0) is an optimal network, in fact for any network g:
BS(g) =
∑
i∈R:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(ni(g))) ≤
≤
∑
i∈R:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(1)) ≤
≤ 0 = BS(g0).
Similarly, if C ≥ Φ(1) and R is even then a symmetric network with degree one (g1) is an optimal network, in
fact for any network g:
BS(g) =
∑
i∈R:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(ni)) ≤
≤
∑
i∈R:
ni≥1
(C − Φ(1)) ≤
≤
∑
i∈R
(C − Φ(1)) =
= BS(g1).
Let us consider now C ≥ Φ(1) and R odd. Given a network g, there are two possibilities: 1) all the players have
at least a connection, or 2) there is at least one player without connections.
In case 1) there is at least one player -say player l- with two or more connections. Let consider the network g12
where that player has two connections and all the other players have only one. It holds:
BS(g) =
∑
i∈R:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(ni)) ≤
≤
∑
i∈R−{l}:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(1)) + (C − Φ(2)) ≤
≤
∑
i∈R−{l}
(C − Φ(1)) + (C − Φ(2)) =
= BS(g12).
In case 2) there is at least one player -say player m- without any connection. Let consider the network g10 where
that player has no connection and all the other players have only one. It holds:
BS(g) =
∑
i∈R:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(ni)) =
=
∑
i∈R−{m}:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(ni)) ≤
≤
∑
i∈R−{m}:
ni(g)≥1
(C − Φ(1)) ≤
≤
∑
i∈R−{m}
(C − Φ(1)) =
= BS(g10).
One out of g12 and g10 is an optimal network. The two networks differ only for the connections of three nodes.
The difference of their payoffs is:
B(g12) − B(g10) =
=
(
2
(
C
2
− Φ(1)
)
+ 2C − Φ(2)
)
+
−2
(
C − Φ(1)
)
=
= C − Φ(2).
Hence if C ≥ Φ(2) g12 is an optimal network, while if C ≤ Φ(2) g10 is an optimal network.
If the inequalities in the hypothesis are strict, then all the optimal networks differ only for a permutation of the
players. For example let us consider C > Φ(1) and R even. Given a symmetric network with degree one g1, all the
other symmetric networks with degree one have clearly the same payoff because of Eq. (26) and can be obtained
by permutation of the players in g1. Let us consider another network g which cannot be obtained by a permutation
of players in g1, g differs from g1 at least for the degree of one player, say it l. Player l has no connection or
has more than one. If player l is not connected in g, hence its contribution to BS(g) is null, if it is connected
C − Φ(nl) < C − Φ(1) because nl > 1. In both cases its contribution to BS(g) is smaller than its contribution in
g1, and it follows:
BS(g) < BS(g1),
hence g cannot be an optimal network. Similar reasoning leads to the result for the other cases.
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We prove the result for h ∈ {1, 2, · · · , R − 2} and b(h, h) < 0, the other cases (b(0, 0) < 0, h = R − 1,
h ∈ {0, 1, · · ·R− 2}and b(h) = 0) can be carried on similarly. In this case b(h− 1, h− 1)¿0.
We need only to check that the function w : G→ R:
w(g) = −
R∑
i=1
f(ni),
where
f(ni) =
 h− ni if h ≥ niR(ni − h) otherwise
satisfies the relation in Lemma 3 for our overlay formation game.
Part I: “g′ defeats g” ⇒ “w(g′) > w(g) and g′ and g are adjacent”
Clearly g′ and g are adjacent by definition of defeat.
If g′ defeats g, then either 1) g′ = g − gi,j and Bi(g′) > Bi(g) or 2) g′ = g + gi,j and Bi(g′) > Bi(g) and
Bj(g′) ≥ Bj(g). Note that Bi(g − gi,j) > Bi(g)⇔ b(ni(g′), nj(g′)) = b(ni(g)− 1, nj(g)− 1) < 0⇔ nj(g) > h.
Hence in case 1) nj(g) > h and
w(g′)− w(g) = −f(ni(g)− 1)− f(nj(g)− 1) +
+f(ni(g)) + f(nj(g)) =
= (f(ni(g))− f(ni(g)− 1)) +
+(f(nj(g))− f(nj(g)− 1)) =
= (f(ni(g))− f(ni(g)− 1)) +R.
If ni > h, f(ni(g))− f(ni(g)− 1) = R, otherwise f(ni(g))− f(ni(g)− 1) ≥ −1. In both cases:
w(g′)− w(g) > 0.
The marginal benefit b(ni, nj) is only a function of nj and it decreases as nj increases (see comments in
Appendix V). We are considering b(h, h) = b(h) < 0 and b(h − 1, h − 1) = b(h − 1) > 0, hence b(k) is always
different from zero, and Bj(g′) ≥ Bi(g)⇐ Bj(g′) > Bi(g). Hence if g′ = g + gi,j defeats g then Bi(g′) > Bi(g)
and Bj(g′) > Bj(g). Note also that Bi(g + gi,j) > Bi(g) ⇔ b(ni(g), nj(g)) > 0 ⇔ nj(g) < h. Hence in case 2)
nj(g) < h and ni(g) < h. It follows:
w(g′)− w(g) = −f(ni(g) + 1)− f(nj(g) + 1) +
+f(ni(g)) + f(nj(g)) =
= (f(ni(g))− f(ni(g) + 1)) +
+(f(nj(g))− f(nj(g) + 1)) =
= 2 > 0.
Part II: “w(g′) > w(g) and g′ and g are adjacent” ⇒ “g′ defeats g”
If g′ = g + gi,j ,
w(g′)− w(g) = −f(ni(g) + 1)− f(nj(g) + 1) +
+f(ni(g)) + f(nj(g)) =
= (f(ni(g))− f(ni(g) + 1)) +
+(f(nj(g))− f(nj(g) + 1)),
and w(g′) − w(g) can be positive only if ni(g) < h and nj(g) < h. In this case b(ni(g), nj(g)) > 0 and
b(nj(g), ni(g)) > 0 and g′ defeats g.
If g′ = g − gi,j ,
w(g′)− w(g) = −f(ni(g)− 1)− f(nj(g)− 1) +
+f(ni(g)) + f(nj(g)) =
= (f(ni(g))− f(ni(g)− 1)) +
+(f(nj(g))− f(nj(g)− 1)),
and w(g′) − w(g) can be positive only if ni(g) > h or nj(g) > h. In this case b(ni(g′), nj(g′)) < 0 or
b(nj(g′), ni(g′)) < 0, hence g′ defeats g.
